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Arbitration at the Tipping Point:
Challenging Claim-Suppressing Arbitration
Clauses
James Parrinello*
If you have entered into a contract for goods or services with a corporation recently, then
chances are that an arbitration clause governs any potential legal claims you may have
arising from that contractual relationship. In theory, arbitration is a cheap and efficient
way to assert claims and allows a claimant to avoid the backlogged court system. For
consumers, however, arbitration has morphed into a dispute resolution system that is no
longer a fair alternative to the courts. Two recent Supreme Court decisions have validated
corporations’ use of the inequitable, claim-suppressing mechanism known as a class
action arbitration waiver. The simple clause prevents claimants from forming groups to
assert common claims and share costs in the arbitral proceeding. In practice, a
corporation with an enforceable class action arbitration waiver will reap a windfall
because an individual claimant will choose not to pursue a claim that will cost more to
bring than she expects to recover. In court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for
class action lawsuits when individual claims would not be viable. Class action arbitration
waivers eliminate the comparable mechanism in arbitration and provide corporations
with a strong incentive to insert such clauses into contracts with consumers. This Note
analyzes recent Supreme Court class arbitration precedent and considers potential
challenges to these disadvantageous arbitration clauses.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; hopeful bar passer and
future lawyer. I would like to thank Professor Leo Martinez, not only for being instrumental in helping
me to craft the topic and hone the substance of this Note, but also for his unconscionable 1L contracts
exam that shocked me out of academic cruise control. Special shout out to my study group, the
University of Rochester Men’s Soccer team, and my friends for putting up with me through law school.
Finally, to my parents and siblings (yes you, sis and bro-in-law), many thanks for supporting me and
helping me reach this point. It was not a fun process, but hopefully the end product more than makes
up for an often trying three years.
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Introduction
Millions of consumers enter into contractual agreements with
corporations every day. Disputes relating to these transactions are bound
to occur, and both contracting parties have an incentive to settle disputes
in a fair, quick, inexpensive, and informal manner over the alternative of
slow and costly litigation. Arbitration has emerged as the most
prominent dispute resolution system, with the Dominant Contracting
1
Party (“DCP”) often inserting arbitration clauses or provisions into

1. This classification denotes a party dominantly situated during and after negotiating the
agreement as a whole. The Dominant Contracting Party (“DCP”) may have such superior position
because: they are wealthier and have a team of advisors on staff; are better-versed in the applicable
law; have repeatedly contracted with similar parties and know how to respond in certain situations; or
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contracts with consumers to restrict court access and prevent the
2
adjudication of claims.
An overwhelming majority of these arbitration clauses now contain
class action arbitration waivers (“CAAWs”). CAAWs prohibit a
representative from asserting the claims of a group of similarly affected
3
individuals in an arbitral proceeding. This forces the vulnerable
4
contracting party (“VCP”), often a consumer or small entity similarly
lacking in bargaining leverage or the wherewithal for counsel to
individually bear any and all costs not specifically assumed or shared by
the DCP in the initial contract. The sentiment among leading arbitration
commentators is that “[t]he ‘class waiver’ issue is the single most
contentious issue surrounding arbitration provisions” in contracts of
5
adhesion with consumers.
In 2011, the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v.
6
Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
7
preempted California’s Discover Bank rule that prohibited certain
8
CAAWs as “unconscionable.” This past year, the Supreme Court
determined in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant that the
“vindication of statutory rights” doctrine, which permits invalidation of
arbitration agreements based on public policy grounds, did not apply to
situations in which proving the underlying violations would be so costly
9
that it would effectively prevent an individual from asserting a claim.

they have the market power to offer the contract on a take it or leave it basis. Many of the sources
cited in this Note often refer to this type of party generally as “corporations”—the term used here
seeks to clarify scholarship and encompass all of the different types of parties with the dominant
contracting position.
2. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Preispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 55, 56 (2004)
(explaining how arbitration provisions proliferated in consumer contracts).
3. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (2000); see also Edward Wood Dunham, The
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 Franchise L.J. 141, 142 (1997) (urging franchisors to
adopt binding arbitration.
4. A Vulnerable Contracting Party (“VCP”) generally refers to the party offered a contract on a
take it or leave it basis, without the leverage to cause meaningful change to the terms of the
agreement. This term includes incorporated entities that have little or no bargaining power when
dealing with a more powerful party.
5. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 323, 371 (2011). See
generally Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About
Separation of Powers, 12 J. Consumer & Com. L. 151 (2009) (explaining that class arbitration, though
widely criticized, is an extremely valuable tool for consumer redress and marketplace control).
6. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
7. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
8. The term “unconscionable” was originated by the Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302
and has been adopted in the California Civil Code § 1670.5 as a contract defense. See Cal. Civil Code
§ 1670.5 (West 2011).
9. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312–13 (2013).
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Taken together, these decisions leave consumers subject to CAAWs with
little hope for redress and permit DCPs to contractually suppress
individual claims.
This Note explains the consequences CAAWs have on consumer
claims and how the Supreme Court’s FAA and “effective vindication”
analyses have rendered CAAWs almost unchallengeable, and outlines the
possible strategies a VCP may employ to evade cost-prohibitive individual
arbitration due to the presence of a CAAW. Specifically, this Note argues
that either an amendment to the FAA or enactment of similar federal
legislation is needed to provide claimants with the means to invalidate
arbitration provisions containing CAAWs that immunize DCPs from
liability.

I. Background
A. The Rise of Arbitration and Class Action Arbitration Waivers
Arbitration, the process of submitting disputes to a neutral party to
render binding decisions and awards, was primarily utilized by commercial
entities and trade associations from this country’s inception to the early
10
1920s. During this period, arbitration remained confined to the business
world because the process of arbitrating disputes was considered
11
“outside of and in tension with the legal system.” Common law courts
refused to compel arbitration because they considered arbitration
12
agreements to be revocable by either party at any time. Courts expressed
13
concern that arbitration agreements “ousted” the court of its jurisdiction
and that there was no way to ensure the process would be fair and
14
equitable. Therefore, parties had to litigate “disputes notwithstanding
15
arbitration clauses,” rendering them completely ineffective.
1. The Federal Arbitration Act
Congress responded in 1925 by passing what is now known as the
16
Federal Arbitration Act. Specifically, section 2 of the FAA provides, in
pertinent part: “A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a

10. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 971–72 (1999).
11. Id. at 973.
12. Id. at 975.
13. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (“[A]greements in advance to oust the courts of
the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”).
14. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 10, at 975.
15. Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About
Law-Making, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 391, 395 (2013).
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). Initially the legislation was titled the United States Arbitration Act
of 1925, ch. 213, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (1994))
[hereinafter FAA].
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transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
17
equity for the revocation of any such contract.”
Following the legislation’s passage, the Supreme Court interpreted
the FAA to be a clear “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
18
procedural policies to the contrary.” Accordingly, arbitration provisions
were to be evaluated on the same footing as all other contractual
19
provisions.
Many scholars question whether Congress intended the FAA to make
arbitration provisions enforceable in all contracts, regardless of the identity
20
of the contracting parties. Some argue that the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the FAA to only govern arbitration
21
provisions in contracts between commercial entities. However, the
Supreme Court determined that section 2 of the FAA extends to all
arbitration provisions regardless of the type of contract, including those
22
23
embedded in consumer contracts. In Perry v. Thomas, the Court
identified the FAA as a valid exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and extended its application to state courts in the
24
context of transactions involving interstate commerce. Under the

17. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
18. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 147
(2010); see also Letter from Gary M. Paul, President, Am. Assoc. for Justice, to Monica Jackson,
Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (June 23, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/CFPB_Arbitration_Comments_6-12_aaj.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 107 (2006) (referring to
testimony of Julius Cohen, General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, in
Congressional hearings that the bill would not apply to contracts of adhesion); David S. Schwartz,
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239, 243 (2012) (concluding that
“[a]rbitration under the FAA was not intended to be a claim-suppressing vehicle for the benefit of
wealthier parties in one-sided contracts,” and it should never be extended to parties outside of the
business or trade community); Wasserman, supra note 15, at 399 (“[T]he Act was not intended to
validate arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion, but rather to render enforceable voluntary
arbitration agreements between merchants.”).
22. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation that the FAA does not apply to consumer contracts).
23. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
24. See Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 328 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987)); see
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1984).
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25

Supremacy Clause, the FAA preempts state law and thus all arbitration
26
agreements except those that remain purely intrastate are enforceable.
2. Policy Rationale for Arbitration
Congress unanimously passed the FAA in order to “reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place
27
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”
Supporters contend that arbitration “‘takes less time and costs less than
litigation;’ it is ‘fair and effective;’ and it offers ‘a quick, cheap, and easy
dispute resolution mechanism’ that is ‘more efficient’ than resolving
28
disputes through litigation.” Other benefits include the preservation of
29
30
parties’ relationships, confidentiality from disclosure, and the increased
31
predictability of outcomes due to arbitrator expertise and incentives.
Arbitration is not universally lauded. Opponents argue that, while
arbitration is in theory an inexpensive and quick alternative to the court
32
system, in reality the system is rigged against VCPs. The setup of
arbitration inherently incentivizes arbitrators to lessen claimant damages
to influence repeat players—almost always DCPs—to select those
33
arbitrators for future dispute resolution. Arbitration also tends to be a
“less elaborate means of adjudication than litigation,” so the contracting
parties “should not expect the full panoply of procedural and substantive

25. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
26. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277–79 (1995) (noting the distinction
between the typical “involving interstate commerce” test under the commerce clause and section 2’s
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” but concluding that the FAA applies if there is
commerce in fact).
27. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). For clarity’s sake, the Supreme
Court often uses the terms “agreement to arbitrate” interchangeably with “arbitration provision.” This
Note uses the less confusing “arbitration provision” or “arbitration clause” whenever possible.
28. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 878 (2008) (citations
omitted).
29. See generally Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Business-to-Business Mediation/Arbitration vs.
Litigation: What Courts, Statistics & Public Perceptions Show About How Commercial
Mediation and Commerical Arbitration Compare to the Litigation System (Jan. 2005).
30. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1211,
1222−26 (2006).
31. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. Legal. Stud. 549, 575 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers to
Consumer Protection, 78 Mich. B.J. 302, 303–04 (1999) (outlining the various ways in which arbitration
makes consumer claims more difficult).
33. See id.; see also Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely? Arbitration Forum’s Rulings
Called One-Sided, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2000, at E01.

June 2014]

ARBITRATION AT THE TIPPING POINT

1447

34

protection offered by a court of law.” A sophisticated party might
understand this point from the outset and use it to its advantage, while a
party lacking experience in dispute resolution would likely not
understand that this could make proving a claim difficult or even
impossible. Further, arbitration limits claimants in a number of ways that
litigation does not—it provides for minimal discovery, prevents the right
to a jury trial, and seriously limits the right to appeal the decision or
35
award.
DCPs particularly prefer arbitration to litigation when handling
disputes with VCPs, such as customers, employees, and smaller business
entities, for a number of reasons. First, arbitration lowers defense costs
and plaintiffs’ fees because discovery and pretrial motions are generally
36
reduced or even eliminated. Second, arbitration lowers damage awards,
as arbitrators are more likely to “split the baby” by providing some
37
recovery although giving less than what a jury would. Third, arbitration
provisions generally require absolute privacy, keeping any findings or
decisions away from the public eye and preventing media coverage of a
38
dispute or award. This prevents other claimants from relying on the
facts or conclusions uncovered in the proceeding. Finally, the Supreme
Court’s FAA jurisprudence authorized a powerful contractual weapon
that, when crafted carefully, can render VCPs unable to assert certain
claims against DCPs. This weapon is the Class Action Arbitration
39
Waiver.

34. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 433, 453 (2010) (quoting Bowles Fin. Grp. Inc. v.
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994)).
35. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 Hastings Bus. L.J. 39, 41−42 (2006).
36. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33, 60.
37. Id. To be fair, this works both ways, because the arbitrator will sometimes award unmeritorious
claims limited damages. See Douglas Shontz et al., Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Business-toBusiness Arbitration in the United States, at ix, 12 (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf. Overall though, when dealing with
larger potential awards, this benefits the DCP because they have the deeper pockets.
38. Id. This exacerbates the problem presented by CAAWs because even if a claimant pursues
individual arbitration, information or facts adduced from the proceeding cannot be shared with other
potential claimants. See, e.g., Unif. Arbitration Act § 17(e) (2000) (“An arbitrator may issue a
protective order to prevent the disclosure of privileged information, confidential information, trade
secrets, and other information protected from disclosure.”).
39. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (explaining that an
arbitration provision that is silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to
submit their dispute to class arbitration”). This decision implicitly suggests that contractual language
preventing a class from forming would be upheld. See Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 333 (noting that
the Stolt decision was “perceived by some as a clear signal of the Court’s lack of receptiveness to
concerns about the impact of arbitration provisions on plaintiff’s ability to bring class actions”).
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3. Class Action Arbitration Waivers
The Supreme Court has long endorsed the mechanism by which a
representative asserts claims in court on the behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals. Class action lawsuits “overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action . . . . A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s
40
(usually an attorney’s) labor.” Congress recognized the need to permit
plaintiffs to form collectively and codified that practical necessity in
41
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Without the ability to
form a class and share costs, individuals would be faced with an
overwhelming disincentive to assert their personal claims, thus immunizing
42
the defendant from liability.
When Congress enacted the FAA’s precursor in 1925, the concept of
forming a class to assert a common claim (whether in litigation or
43
arbitration) was unprecedented. Nonetheless, with the Supreme Court’s
strict adherence to the notion that arbitration provisions must be enforced
as written, DCPs began adding CAAWs to the arbitration provisions of
consumer contracts while relying on the FAA to support their
44
enforceability. Current iterations of CAAWs typically require that any
dispute arising from the contractual relationship may be arbitrated at the
45
election of either side rather than litigated in court.

40. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1191 (2013) (reaffirming that under Rule 23, “[a plaintiff must demonstrate] numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation . . . and [a plaintiff] must also establish that ‘the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy’”).
42. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
43. See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 399 (“The FAA is silent on the issue of class-wide
arbitration . . . .[because] [w]hen Congress passed the [FAA] in 1925, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure had not yet been promulgated and class action litigation for damages was virtually
unknown.”); see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110−11 (Cal. 2005) (providing
historical context that still stands, despite being reversed by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).
44. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 396 (2005) (explaining that many attorneys began recommending
CAAWs after large jury verdicts and deferential Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence).
45. The idea that the permissive language of “may” used in these agreements does not render
them mandatory is illusory; rarely, if ever, will a DCP prefer to litigate rather than arbitrate if the
CAAW is enforceable. See Schwartz, supra note 36, at 60–67 (listing several reasons corporations
prefer arbitration to litigation).
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An example of such a CAAW in the Comcast Residential Services
Agreement (which many readers have probably not thought twice about
looking over) reads as follows:
13. Binding Arbitration
a. Purpose. If you have a Dispute (as defined below) with Comcast that
cannot be resolved through an informal dispute resolution with
Comcast, you or Comcast may elect to arbitrate that Dispute in
accordance with the terms of this Arbitration Provision rather than
litigate the Dispute in court. Arbitration means you will have a fair
hearing before a neutral arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or
jury. Proceeding in arbitration may result in limited discovery and may
be subject to limited review by courts.

...
f. Restrictions: . . . .
2. ALL PARTIES TO THE ARBITRATION MUST BE
INDIVIDUALLY NAMED. THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR
AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED OR
LITIGATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED
BASIS OR ON BASES INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN A
PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF
THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY
46
GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS.

While arbitration is now the norm in most contracts, many DCPs
confine their use of CAAWs to agreements with VCPs. A 2004 study
found that 30.8% of the arbitration clauses they surveyed contained a class
47
action preclusion mechanism. A more recent 2008 study found that while
only 6% of non-consumer contracts contained arbitration clauses, 76.9%
of consumer-DCP contracts contained arbitration clauses and every one of
48
those clauses contained waivers for class-wide arbitration.
Some commentators contend that CAAWs are used to intentionally
suppress claims. The authors of the 2008 study suggested that DCPs’
“selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against
each other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be
based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that corporations are

46. Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, Comcast, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/
Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement.html (last visited June 1, 2014). As the reader can clearly see
from this clause, some of the problems with arbitration explained in Part I.A.ii of this Note are noted
in this clause itself. Comcast, like many other DCPs, permits consumers to opt out of the arbitration
clause. However, the ability to opt-out is time-barred at thirty days. Due to the fact that most never
read the fine print, few (if any) actually avoid arbitration.
47. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 66. The authors surveyed arbitration clauses across
many industries, including financial services, insurance, retail services, healthcare, travel, and housing
and home services. Id. at 63.
48. Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 883–84. In addition, sixty percent of those clauses deemed
arbitration void if the arbitration process allowed for class-wide activity. Id. at 884. To place this in the
context of avoiding collective activity as a whole through the FAA, the authors noted “[n]o litigation class
action waivers were found in consumer or other contracts in the absence of an arbitration clause.” Id.
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49

better serving their customers.” They further posited that “[t]he growth
of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears to be part of a broader
50
initiative by corporations to preclude or limit aggregate litigation.” Thus,
an enforceable CAAW fully prevents aggregate recovery.
Despite the already prevalent use of CAAWs in agreements with
consumers, DCPs remained susceptible to the possibility that a court
would invalidate an arbitration agreement due to the presence of a
51
CAAW. Challenges swept through the lower courts, with plaintiffconsumers anticipating that they would be foreclosed from arbitration due
52
to cost. The claimants would initially assert claims in court and then
oppose the inevitable motions to compel individual arbitration based on
state or federal contract defenses. In 2011, the Supreme Court delivered
the Concepcion opinion, dismissing California’s attempt to invalidate
53
certain CAAWs as unconscionable. In 2013, with Italian Colors, the
54
Supreme Court all but shut the door to CAAW challenges based on cost.

II. The Supreme Court Solidifies the Enforceability of CAAWs
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance the general purpose of
the FAA to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
49. Id. at 895; id. at 888 (“Companies prefer individual over aggregate dispute resolution because
aggregate treatment creates overwhelming settlement pressure and because few consumers will seek
redress on an individual basis due to lack of information or the small amounts in dispute. Companies
could attempt to address this problem by imposing waivers of class action litigation in their consumer
contracts. But such waivers would be politically controversial and also would face a risk of being
declared unconscionable by courts. The mandatory arbitration clause is a preferable alternative. Such
clauses, if effective, may have the same result as class action waivers: they prevent class actions and
remit consumers to individual actions which, in light of the stakes, are usually not worthwhile to
pursue. But mandatory arbitration clauses are easier to sell and enforce than class action waivers.
Because arbitration is often seen as cheaper and simpler than litigation, the company can claim that it
is helping rather than hurting its customers. This reduces political costs and also increases the
prospects that the clause will be upheld in court. In short, mandatory arbitration offers companies an
opportunity to claim that they are concerned for consumer welfare while simultaneously denying their
customers any practical avenue for redress.”).
50. Id.; cf. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 472–75 (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871 (2008)) (explaining that the authors of Summer
Soldiers only identified certain industries with higher than normal arbitration rates, and that concerns
over class actions has not been definitively proven to be the explanation for the prevalence of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).
51. See Benjamin R. Dwyer & Christopher M. Mason, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Class Action
Waivers in Consumer Contracts: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Nixon Peabody (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/Supreme_Court_upholds_class_action_waivers_in_consumer_contracts;
see also Class Action Waivers in Commercial and Consumer Arbitration Agreements After Concepcion,
Bryan Cave (June 8, 2011), http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/35d9ae19-a177-4721-b601069566c842e8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c5bccad8-16e3-49f5-9393092eb08305bf/Concepcion%20Client%20Alert.pdf.
52. See Dwyer & Mason, supra note 51.
53. See infra Part II.A.ii.
54. See infra Part IV.
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55

agreements” with the practical reality that arbitration must remain a fair
alternative to the courts. The Court produced opinions reflecting such a
dilemma, leaving litigants unsure whether arbitration clauses would
remain enforceable if the arbitration’s costs precluded the potential for
positive recovery by claimants.
A. AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION
The FAA’s text provides one straightforward means to escape an
arbitration provision. Known as the FAA’s “savings clause,” the last
phrase of section 2 permits the invalidation of agreements to arbitrate
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
56
contract.” While the clause encompasses arguments based on state
contract defenses, “[c]ourts may not invalidate arbitration agreements
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions. . . . [because]
Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for
57
suspect status.” Therefore, state law can only invalidate arbitration
58
provisions if the law is applied evenhandedly to all contracts.
1. The Discover Bank Rule
In California, courts are empowered by statute to refuse enforcement
59
of unfairly one-sided or “unconscionable” contractual provisions. The
“unconscionability [defense] has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive
element,’ the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal
60
bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” As
arbitration provisions proliferated in consumer contracts, California courts
commonly used a far less stringent test to evaluate the “unconscionability”
61
of arbitration provisions than to assess all other contracts.
In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court determined that an
arbitration provision was unenforceable because it contained a CAAW
that would exculpate the defendant, Discover Bank, from small claim
55. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
56. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (referring to grounds such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability); see
also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (explaining that the
“savings clause” indicates that Congress intended the FAA to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483–
84 (1989) (reiterating the Supreme Court’s interpretation that the FAA upholds arbitration
agreements, except under the grounds mentioned in the savings clause).
57. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
58. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (explaining that the
FAA “makes any such state policy unlawful” because it “would place arbitration clauses on an
unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent”).
59. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5 (West 2008) (codifying the principal that a court can refuse to
enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract); see also Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d
503, 511 (Cal. 1985).
60. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
61. See generally Broome, supra note 35.
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62

liability. The Discover Bank court noted that the CAAW acted to
“deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small
sums of money” because no consumer would rationally bring an individual
63
claim. The court determined that CAAWs are “unconscionable” if they
“operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be
64
imposed under California law.”
2. Concepcion Overrules Discover Bank
The Discover Bank rule did not withstand scrutiny from the United
States Supreme Court for long. In Concepcion, two AT&T customers
sought to avoid individual arbitration of their state-law fraud and false
65
advertising claims in federal court. The district court denied the motion
66
to compel arbitration, relying on the Discover Bank rule. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, additionally holding that the FAA did not preempt the
rule because the Discover Bank rule was a “refinement of the
67
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the FAA preempted the
Discover Bank rule, rejecting Concepcion’s argument against
68
enforceability of the CAAW. Specifically, the Concepcion Court
determined that the Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with the FAA
and therefore preempted because it fundamentally altered the written
arbitration agreement when it required the availability of class-wide
69
arbitration. The Court highlighted some key problems that arise when
parties are forced to shift from bilateral to class action arbitration:
decreased efficiency of the process, the need for procedural formality,
70
increased risk to defendants, and limited opportunity for appeal.
In response to the dissent’s claims that class action arbitration may
be necessary to prevent small claims from slipping through the cracks,
62. 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[W]hen the [CAAW] is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums
of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver
becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury
to the person or property of another.’ (Civ. Code, § 1668). Under these circumstances, such waivers
are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1109.
65. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1774 (2011).
66. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. o5-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *1 (S.D. Cal Aug. 11, 2008)
(holding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable because AT&T failed to show that the
arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions).
67. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Shroyer v. New
Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
68. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
69. Id. at 1748–49 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
70. Id. at 1752–53.
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the Court strongly emphasized that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure
that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated
71
reasons.” In addition, the Court noted that AT&T’s arbitration clause
was extremely claimant-friendly, and that, due to beneficial fee-shifting
72
provisions, small claims brought individually would likely be resolved.
Therefore, there was no risk that the claimants would end up in the red if
73
they engaged in individual arbitration with AT&T.
Concepcion established that the FAA preempted state-law doctrines
designed to invalidate agreements to arbitrate, regardless of the public
74
policy concerns they are designed to serve. Thus, plaintiffs were left
only to rely on either state law applicable equally to all contracts or
federal law to challenge the enforceability of a CAAW. Until recently,
federal common law permitted cost-based challenges to CAAWs under a
doctrine first enunciated in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
75
Randolph as the “effective vindication of statutory rights.”
B. The “Vindication of Statutory Rights” Doctrine
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a string of decisions that
ostensibly left the door open to challenging CAAWs when arbitration of
76
federal claims would be too costly to undertake as an individual. The
litigation theory went that if a party to a dispute governed by an
arbitration provision had no incentive to bring a federal cause of action
due to high fees and net-negative potential recovery, then the arbitration
itself would effectively deny that individual the ability to vindicate his or
her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.

71. Id. at 1753.
72. Id. The clause provided that AT&T would pay claimants a minimum of $7500 and twice their
attorney’s fees if the claimant obtained an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement
award. The district court, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court all agreed that the arbitration clause
inured to the customer’s benefit due to these beneficial terms. Id.; see Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 371
(noting that the Court selected an arbitration provision with “an artful eye to the desired (and
eventual) result”). The clause has been widely praised and many commentators have weighed in on
how to model consumer arbitration clauses after AT&T’s to avoid court challenges to their
enforceability. See, e.g., Yvette Ostolaza, Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Financial
Services Contracts, BNA Class Action Litig. Rep. (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_cccle_materials/9_1.authcheckdam.pdf;
Arthur J. Rooney, How Safe Is Your Arbitration Agreement Post-AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
Seyfarth Shaw Client Alerts (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.seyfarth.com/ publications/SI010612.
73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011). The majority cited the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Laster that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be “essentially
guarantee[d]” to be made whole in the arbitration scheme. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
584 F.3d 849, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009).
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
75. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013); see also infra Part II.B.
76. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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With arbitration provisions spreading to all sorts of contracts, the
Supreme Court repeatedly heard cases that dealt with whether federal
77
statutory claims could be appropriately resolved through arbitration. In
every case, the Court answered in the affirmative, permitting the
underlying federal claims to be subject to arbitration absent congressional
78
intent to require court access. However, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court qualified the expansive use of
arbitration, stating that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” that
federal statute’s purpose would continue to be served and arbitration
79
would be permitted.
In Mitsubishi Motors, the plaintiff worried that the international
80
arbitrator would not apply treble damages in an antitrust action. The
Court explained that there was no reason to assume that international
arbitration would not provide adequate relief, but if arbitration indeed
operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory
remedies for antitrust violations, [the Court] would have little hesitation
81
in condemning the agreement as against public policy.” This precedent
gave cost-based challenges a lifeline.
The Court revisited the “effective vindication” doctrine, as it relates
82
to arbitration, in 2000. In Green Tree, the plaintiff alleged that the
83
defendant, Green Tree, violated the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal
84
Credit Opportunity Act by failing to disclose an additional insurance
85
charge. The plaintiff challenged Green Tree’s motion to compel
arbitration pursuant to Green Tree’s standard lending arbitration clause
because “she lacked the resources to arbitrate, and as a result, would
86
have to forgo her claims against [Green Tree].” The Court rejected her
argument because the agreement did not expressly delineate costs, and
77. See generally Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 825 (2012).
78. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding that Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 claims could be arbitrated); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (finding that Securities Act of 1933 claims were
arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (concluding that
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims
were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629 (permitting arbitration of Sherman Act claims);
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24−25 (1983) (determining that the
FAA is a congressional determination that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”).
79. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637.
80. Id. at 635.
81. Id. at 637 n.19.
82. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 79 (2000).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–16 (2012).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–91(f) (2000).
85. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83.
86. Id. at 83–84.
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she therefore failed to carry her burden to show that the arbitration was
87
cost prohibitive.
However, the Green Tree Court provided a legal theory upon which
to base future challenges to arbitration provisions, writing that where “a
party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden
88
of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” The Court had never
before endorsed the concept that an arbitration provision could be
89
defeated on the basis of excessive cost. The Green Tree Court established
that if the plaintiff made a sufficient factual showing, then the court could
potentially invalidate the arbitration agreement for being cost-prohibitive.

III. Confusion Among the Circuits After CONCEPCION
Prior to Concepcion, lower courts generally applied Green Tree to
90
arbitration clauses containing various waivers, including CAAWs.
However, those courts often found the plaintiff unable to meet the high
91
burden of proof necessary for Green Tree to apply. Only one circuit court
pre-Concepcion invalidated a CAAW under the Green Tree doctrine,
92
severing the clause from the original agreement. After Concepcion,
87. Id. at 91–92.
88. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000);.
89. Stephen G. Harvey, Decision in the Green Tree Case a Victory for Lenders and Borrowers,
Pepper
Hamilton
LLP
(Jan. 11,
2001),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=74 (“Although the Court’s ruling upheld the use of arbitration
clauses in consumer finance contracts, it should not be read as a signal that the Court will permit
arbitration agreements that foist excessive arbitration costs on consumers.”).
90. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a party could
demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively expensive,
such a showing could invalidate and agreement.”); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.
2007) (agreeing with the Kristian court’s determination that the enforceability of a particular CAAW
includes an inquiry into “the cost to an individual plaintiff of vindicating the claim when compared to the
plaintiff’s potential recovery”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (severing the
CAAW and determining that the class ban on arbitration would undoubtedly preclude the plaintiff from
vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum due to high costs). Compare Booker v. Robert
Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reaffirming the applicability of the Green Tree test, while
noting that the party resisting arbitration bears a high burden of showing that the terms of the arbitration
interfere with effective vindication of statutory rights, and that burden cannot be satisfied by “mere
speculation”), with Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“[A]n arbitration agreement that prohibits use of the judicial forum as a means of resolving statutory
claims must also provide for an effective and accessible alternative forum.”).
91. See, e.g., Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 780 (10th Cir. 2010) (referring to Green
Tree’s high threshold to explain that plaintiff failed to meet its burden); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA,
583 F.3d 549, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evidence
to satisfy the Green Tree standard); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 50 F.3d at 285 (acknowledging
the validity of cost-based challenges to arbitration but concluding the plaintiff had not adequately
established such a challenge); Lowry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-0816, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 128907, at *8–9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s cost-based argument because
he provided a “mere estimate” that did not satisfy his burden).
92. Kristian, 446 F.3d. at 64.
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circuit courts have split on the issue of whether factually supported costbased challenges could render CAAW’s unenforceable, applying either
Green Tree’s vindication of statutory rights doctrine or Concepcion’s
mandate of strict adherence to the FAA without regard to policy, or
cost-based, concerns.
A. The Majority of Lower Courts Follow CONCEPCION
The majority of circuit courts concluded that Concepcion rejected
cost-based challenges to CAAWs, therefore eliminating the Green Tree
93
arbitration challenge. In Coneff v. AT&T Corp., the plaintiff asserted
both state unjust enrichment and breach of contract claims as well as
94
violations of the Federal Communications Act against defendant AT&T.
The Coneff court found the “vindication of statutory rights” argument
unpersuasive and granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration,
observing that Concepcion had rejected “such unrelated policy concerns,
95
however worthwhile, [because they] cannot undermine the FAA.”
Other circuit court decisions track similar reasoning. The Eleventh
Circuit dealt with a challenge to the same plaintiff-friendly AT&T
arbitration clause after plaintiffs asserted state causes of action on behalf
96
of a class. The court rejected a Florida law voiding CAAWs as against
public policy despite an evidentiary showing by the plaintiffs that they
97
could not obtain adequate representation individually. The court noted
that “[t]he Plaintiffs’ evidence goes only to substantiating the very public
policy arguments that were expressly rejected by . . . Concepcion—
namely, that the class action waiver will be exculpatory, because most of
98
these small-value claims will go undetected and unprosecuted.” This

93. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2012); Quillion v. Tenet
HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1157
(9th Cir. 2012); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
94. Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1157.
95. Id. at 1159 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011)).
96. Cruz, 648 F.3d at 1206.
97. Id. at 1214.
98. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that Concepcion foreclosed challenges to CAAW’s under
the unconscionability doctrine. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2012).
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99

line of reasoning is commonplace among circuit courts and some district
100
courts in circuits that have yet to confront the issue on appeal.
B. The Second Circuit Follows GREEN TREE
On the other side of the split, the Second Circuit distinguished
Concepcion and applied Green Tree to invalidate a cost-prohibitive
CAAW. In In re American Express Merchant’s Litigation (“AMEX I”), a
group of merchants who contracted with American Express (“AMEX”)
filed a class action suit against AMEX, alleging a “tying” violation of
101
antitrust law. The Second Circuit held that the merchants had met their
Green Tree burden by showing that, if forced into individual arbitration,
each merchant would have to finance an economic antitrust study that
102
could run from “about $300 thousand to more than $2 million.” The
court further found that, if successful, an individual plaintiff could only
103
expect an average damages reward between $9,046 and $38,549. The
AMEX I court concluded that AMEX’s CAAW could not be enforced
“because to do so would grant AMEX de facto immunity from antitrust
liability by removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of
104
recovery.”
After two rounds of re-analyzing the case to incorporate newly issued
Supreme Court decisions, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, finally

99. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)
(“Even if Homa cannot effectively prosecute his claim in an individual arbitration that procedure is his
only remedy, illusory or not. Though some persons might regard our result as unfair, [the FAA]
requires that we reach it.”); Quillion v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir.
2012) (explaining that if an agreement explicitly contained a CAAW, a Pennsylvania law prohibiting
CAAW’s would be preempted by the FAA after Concepcion); Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
No. 09-1951, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48237, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs
contention that the agreement to arbitrate was substantively unconscionable because it included a
CAAW in light of Concepcion).
100. See, e.g., Dean v. Draughons Junior Coll., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 751, 673 (M.D. Tenn. 2013)
(explaining that state law cost-prohibitiveness defenses are precluded after Concepcion); King v. Capital
One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 3:11-0068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163562, at *24–25 (W.D. Va. Nov. 15,
2012) (explaining Concepcion forecloses the argument that CAAW’s “make it more difficult to pursue
small claims”); Brokers’ Servs. Mktg. Grp. v. Cellco P’ship, No. 10-3973, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42721, at
*12–14 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012) (rejecting plaintiffs’ vindication of statutory rights defense because
Concepcion foreclosed unrelated policy concerns); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, No. 3:10-0248, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23947, at *40 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a class
arbitration should be permitted even though it would be “impractical” to pursue [their claims]
independently); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting
defendant’s motion to compel because the plaintiff’s cost-based defense cannot survive Concepcion).
101. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03-9592, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2006). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were forced to accept all American Express
cards if they chose to accept the charge card. Id.
102. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 316 (2d Cir. 2009).
103. Id. at 317. These numbers include the standard treble damages awarded in antitrust cases. See
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2014).
104. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d at 320.
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affirmed its ruling in AMEX I and denied rehearing (“AMEX IV”). The
court reiterated that Concepcion does not address federal statutory rights
and is instead wholly focused on the issue of preemption of state law by
106
federal law. The Second Circuit was unequivocal about the continuing
vitality of Green Tree, explaining that its decision to invalidate the
CAAW “gives full effect to a long line of Supreme Court precedent
preserving plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate federal statutory rights, rather
than eviscerating more than 120 years of antitrust law by closing the
107
courthouse door to all but the most well-funded plaintiffs.”
The AMEX IV court distinguished Concepcion and Coneff further by
explaining that, whereas the plaintiffs there lacked adequate “incentive” to
arbitrate their claims individually, “the fee-shifting provisions ensured that
108
a damaged plaintiff could be made whole.” In contrast, the court
explained that the AMEX plaintiffs did not lack incentive to arbitrate;
rather, they were faced with such substantial upfront expenditures that
the only economically feasible means to enforce their statutory rights was
109
by class action. No fee-shifting provisions were available to ever make
110
the plaintiffs whole. In the fall of 2012, the Supreme Court granted
111
AMEX’s petition for certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

IV. ITALIAN COLORS Radically Alters the Arbitration Landscape
Many commentators accurately predicted that the Supreme Court
would use the Italian Colors case to reverse the Second Circuit and refine
112
the scope of the Green Tree doctrine. Indeed, the deck seemed stacked
against the plaintiffs because Justice Sotomayor, a Concepcion dissenter,
113
was forced to recuse herself because she was part of the opinion below.
The result was exactly as predicted.

105. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id. at 142.
108. Id. at 141.
109. Id. Interestingly, the Coneff court actually noted the incentive/feasibility distinction had some
merit in its decision. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).
110. Id.
111. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
112. See, e.g., Archis A. Parasharami, Supreme Court Appears Poised to Reject Second Circuit’s
Articulation of “Effective Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights” Defense for Avoiding Class
Arbitration Waivers, Mayer Brown (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/02/28/
supreme-court-appears-poised-to-reject-second-circuits-articulation-of-effective-vindication-offederal-statutory-rights-defense-for-avoiding-class-arbitration-waivers; SCOTUS Hears Argument in
American
Express
v.
Italian
Colors
Restaurant,
Wage
Law
(Mar. 1,
2013),
http://www.californiawagelaw.com/wage_law/2013/03/scotus-hears-argument-in-american-express-vitalian-colors-restaurant.html; Oral Argument in Italian Colors, Workplace Prof Blog (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/03/oral-argument-in-italian-colors.html.
113. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d at 206; see Rebecca S. Bjork et al., Supreme Court
Argument in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Seyfarth Shaw (Feb. 27, 2013),
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the judge-made
“effective vindication” doctrine could not provide the Italian Colors
114
plaintiffs with relief from individual arbitration with AMEX. The Court
noted that Green Tree remained a viable defense when “a provision in an
arbitration agreement [forbade] the assertion of certain statutory rights”
and would “perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum
115
impracticable.” However, “the fact that it is not worth the expense
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination
116
of the right to pursue that remedy.”
Thus, the majority drew a distinction between arbitration clauses
that prevent the right to pursue a remedy, which courts may invalidate,
and arbitration clauses that increase the expense involved in proving a
117
violation, which do not implicate the “effective vindication” doctrine.
The Italian Colors Court went on to note that Concepcion rejected the
notion that “class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that
118
might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”
The dissent, led by Justice Kagan, did not mince words when it
explained the consequences of the majority’s decision. The CAAW at
issue “impose[d] a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of
the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. . . . [i]f the arbitration clause is
enforceable, [AMEX] has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if
119
it has in fact violated the law.” The “effective vindication” doctrine was
created to “prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s
120
ability to enforce congressionally created rights.”
The dissent continued that if the “effective vindication” rule only
prohibits contractual clauses that expressly exculpate a DCP from liability,
then “companies have every incentive to draft their agreements to extract
backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or
121
pointless.” The dissent argued that the majority’s rule created a scenario
that Congress likely did not envision while passing the FAA: DCPs can
use arbitration provisions to foreclose would-be claimants from both the
122
courts and arbitration.

http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/2664 (“Justice Sotomayor recused herself as a member of the
Second Circuit Panel who issued the decision below.”)
114. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310−11 (2013).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2311.
117. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2011)).
118. Id. at 2312.
119. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2317.
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V. Possible Challenges and a Proposed Way Forward
If the costs associated with pursuing individual arbitration outweigh
a claimant’s potential recovery, pursuit of even meritorious claims is
irrational. Class action lawsuits remedy this inequitable situation in the
litigation context by allowing the aggregation of claims to lessen each
123
plaintiff’s individual costs. Because CAAWs are disproportionately
124
inserted into contracts by DCPs, individual plaintiffs must find some
legal doctrine upon which to challenge the arbitration clause or the
CAAW itself. Otherwise, the VCP is left without a viable claim and the
DCP reaps a windfall by doing no more than inserting specific language
into its standard agreement. After Concepcion and Italian Colors, few
avenues remain realistic. This Part discusses some potential challenges to
mandatory arbitration and the likelihood those challenges can be applied
to successfully overcome CAAWs.
A. State-Law Preemption and Federal-Law Conflict
In Concepcion, the Supreme Court outlined the preemption analysis
that lower courts must undertake when considering challenges to
arbitration clauses involving state and federal law claims. Lower courts
considering state law that conflicts with the FAA have routinely rejected
state-law challenges to arbitration in light of Concepcion. Likewise,
recent Supreme Court guidance suggests that federal statutes will rarely
override the FAA when in conflict.
1. State-Law Challenges
Concepcion reiterated that the FAA per se displaces state laws
125
prohibiting outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim. The
inquiry becomes more complex “when a doctrine normally thought to be
generally applicable . . . is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that
126
disfavors arbitration.” In theory, a VCP seeking to overcome a claimsuppressing CAAW could rely on the state legislature or state common
law on the narrow grounds Concepcion permits. However, lower courts

123. See supra notes 25–27; see also Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected
Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class
Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorney’s Fees and Costs, 65 Tul. L. Rev 1547,
1579 (1990) (“The class action also provides a remedy for those whose claims are too small to justify
the expense of individual litigation. In this way it allows an opportunity to vindicate rights, while
simultaneously encouraging action that may help effectuate policies underlying substantive statutes.”).
124. See supra notes 33–34.
125. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
126. Id.
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after Concepcion generally avoid state-law challenges unless they apply
127
even handedly to other contract disputes as required by Concepcion.
Many federal and state courts read Concepcion as foreclosing state
laws conflicting with the FAA. The Supreme Court in Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Clayton Brown reversed a West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals ruling that the FAA did not preempt the state’s public
policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements in personal injury or
128
wrongful death claims against nursing homes.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., the Missouri Supreme
Court explained that “the FAA does not allow state-law policy
129
considerations to be used to invalidate an arbitration agreement.” Other
130
courts have followed this preemption analysis. State-law challenges
based on statutes or common law that invalidate or obstruct arbitration
provisions are not likely to survive post-Concepcion preemption.
However, state-law doctrines that apply to contracts generally still
remain a viable means to invalidate arbitration provisions or CAAWs. In
Chavarria v. Ralphs, the Ninth Circuit relied on an “unconscionability”
analysis to invalidate the CAAW embedded in Ralph’s Grocery’s
131
employment application. The Chavarria court noted that Concepcion
foreclosed the “unconscionability” doctrine when it applied
132
disproportionately to arbitration provisions.
The court went on to note the egregious procedural and substantive
“unconscionability” of Ralph’s arbitration provision and specifically
concluded that the high up-front costs made access to the forum
impracticable—the exact situation that the Italian Colors majority
133
explained might permit invalidation. The court found that the FAA did
not preempt its “unconscionability” analysis because the law “is not

127. See, e.g., Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 11-1940, 2012 WL 370557 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2012) (finding an arbitration’s costs and appeal provision unconscionable).
128. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc., v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012).
129. Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 516 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
130. See Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the FAA
preempts the Broughton-Cruz rule, which prohibited outright the arbitration claims where the plaintiff
is functioning as a private attorney general on behalf of the general public, after Concepcion), vacated,
rev’d, remanded en banc, Kilgore v. Keybank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The FAA preempts California’s
Broughton-Cruz rule that claims for public injunctive relief cannot be arbitrated.”); Schnuerle v.
Insight Commc’ns, Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 564−65 (Ky. 2012) (concluding that Concepcion preempted a
state policy invalidating contractual waivers of class action participation where it was based on de
minimis claims which are unlikely to be individually litigated). In addition, in light of Concepcion the
California Supreme Court was forced to reconsider their decision holding that a state-law rule finding
arbitration clauses that contain Berman Waivers (providing speedy and informal method to resolve
wage claims) unconscionable was not preempted. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (Frank B.)
No. S174475, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 871 (Cal. Jan. 11, 2012).
131. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2013).
132. Id. at 921.
133. Id. at 927.
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unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a generally applicable
134
policy against abuses of bargaining power.” At least in the Ninth Circuit,
then, state-law challenges can avoid preemption if courts can rationalize
135
that they apply to all contracts generally. However, state-law challenges
must be narrowly tailored and are now generally disfavored by courts
hearing such arguments.
2. Federal-Law Challenges
When a federal statute conflicts with permitting the arbitration of
certain types of claims, the analysis is more complex. The Supreme Court
previously highlighted the importance of enforcing arbitration agreements
by their terms “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude
136
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Therefore,
if a VCP has a federal statutory claim that requires adjudication in the
courts, she may be able to overcome a CAAW because arbitration in
general is disallowed.
In CompuCredit v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court outlined the
analysis to apply when a federal statutory claim seemingly prevents
137
arbitration of a dispute, in conflict with the FAA. The Court explained
that when a federal statutory claim is silent as to whether the claim may
be arbitrated, if an arbitration agreement governs the dispute, the claim
138
must be submitted to arbitration per the FAA. Thus, the CompuCredit
Court established the FAA as the default, requiring other federal
statutory claims to expressly preclude arbitration in its text. Only a few
statutes expressly disallow pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate their
139
corresponding claims.
In the employment context, lower courts have unanimously agreed
140
that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), a federal statute
designed to protect the rights of employees in the private sector, does not
141
preclude the use of CAAWs. In In re D.R. Horton, Inc., an employee

134. Id.
135. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 188 (Cal. 2013) (holding that the
“unconscionability” doctrine may continue to invalidate arbitration agreements after Italian Colors
and Concepcion that are unreasonably one-sided).
136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
137. CompuCredit v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
138. Id. at 673.
139. See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or
Nothing Proposition, 87 Ind. L.J. 289, 289 (2012) (noting that both the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act prohibit predispute agreements to arbitrate specific types of claims); see also Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012).
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
141. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013); see Richards v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 734 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir.
2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that arbitration
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of D.R. Horton alleged that the CAAW previously agreed to violated his
§ 7 NLRA right to engage in concerted legal action addressing wage,
142
hours, or other working conditions. The National Labor Relations
Board agreed, holding that employers cannot compel employees to “waive
their NLRA right to collectively pursue litigation of employment claims in
143
all forums, arbitral or judicial.” On appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained
that CompuCredit required explicit language of congressional intent to
144
override the FAA. The court noted it was “loath to create a circuit
split,” and concluded that the rights of collective action under the NLRA
did not evince a congressional intent to preclude application of the
145
FAA.
Unless the plaintiff’s federal statutory claim explicitly requires court
146
access, courts must enforce the arbitration agreement under the FAA.
Despite the contention that Concepcion only stands for the preemption
of state statutes that conflict with the FAA, the CompuCredit Court
raised the bar slightly higher when asserting federal claims and objecting
147
to individual arbitration in opposition to the FAA. Neither state nor
federal law is a safe bet in opposing an arbitration provision and avoiding
the preclusive effects of a CAAW.
B. Federal Legislation
After Concepcion and Italian Colors, a workable and equitable
solution must be found to provide a remedy in situations in which
CAAWs work an obvious injustice. Congressional action is the best
option to avoid the inequitable, claim-suppressing effect of CAAWs.
Congress should establish a workable rule for courts to follow, limiting
whatever impact these decisions have on CAAWs. Despite current
congressional gridlock on most issues, the protection of VCPs in
agreements containing arbitration clauses should be a policy Congress as
a whole can endorse. If the FAA is to continue its purpose of placing

agreements containing class waivers are enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA); see also
Jeffrey T. Johnson, Ninth Circuit Joins Growing Trend: Declines to Follow D.R. Horton and Upholds
Arbitration Agreement Prohibiting Class Claims, Employers’ Lawyers Blog (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.employerslawyersblog.com/2013/08/ninth-circuit-declines-follow-drhorton-upholdingarbitration-agreement-prohibiting-class-claims-flsa-class-waiver.html.
142. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. ¶ 15546 (Jan. 3,
2012); section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), in pertinent part, requires that
employees have the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
143. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. at *12 (“So long as the employer leaves open a judicial
forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved without requiring the
availability of classwide arbitration.”).
144. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 361.
147. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012).
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arbitration on the same footing as the courts, actual access to justice
within that system is necessary.
1. The Arbitration Fairness Act
In a press release immediately following the Concepcion decision,
Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, and Representative Hank
Johnson announced they were going to reintroduce the Arbitration
148
Fairness Act (“AFA”). They decried Concepcion as “another example
149
of the Supreme Court favoring corporations over consumers.” The
AFA, according to its sponsors, rectifies Concepcion’s detrimental effect
by “eliminat[ing] forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer,
and civil rights cases” and “allow[ing] consumers and workers to choose
150
arbitration after a dispute occurred.” However, the Act has languished
in the Committee on the Judiciary since 2011 and has little hope of ever
151
reaching a full vote.
The AFA is a flawed response to CAAWs because it is overbroad.
The AFA would invalidate the claimant-friendly arbitration provisions
such as the AT&T provision present in Concepcion. The Concepcion
Court noted that the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were in fact
better off under the arbitration agreement than they would have been in a
class action lawsuit because the claimants were essentially guaranteed to
152
be made whole. If enacted, the AFA would prevent what Myriam Gilles
calls “consumer friendly arbitration clauses”—clauses specifically designed
to “provide courts with comfort that the elimination of aggregate
153
procedures will not serve to prevent the vindication of rights.”
The companies that adopt “consumer friendly” provisions give the
claimant the ability to vindicate her rights, and in theory provide a race
to the top in terms of VCP-beneficial arbitration provisions instead of an
154
outright ban on rights vindication. CAAWs can still benefit the
individual because, in order to stave off court challenges, companies will
rationally choose to make their individual arbitration procedures more
beneficial to claimants and eliminate the argument that binding arbitration

148. Press Release, Sen. Franken, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce
Legislation Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts Against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1466.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); see Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration
Fairness Act, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/
concepcion-and-the-arbitration-fairness-act.
152. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
153. Gilles, supra note 77, at 829, 844.
154. Id. at 865.

June 2014]

ARBITRATION AT THE TIPPING POINT

1465

is unjust. This does not prevent vindication of rights, and keeps intact all of
155
the benefits of arbitration discussed earlier.
Any federal legislation should be narrowed to specifically invalidate
CAAWs that act as a Hobson’s choice for claimants: abandon meritorious
claims or face overwhelming, unrecoverable costs to obtain any relief.
2. FAA Amendment or Similar Federal Legislation
In order to avoid the pitfalls that would follow from an outright ban
on arbitration in consumer and employment contexts, Congress instead
should either amend the FAA or introduce new legislation aimed directly
at CAAWs that prevent the claimant from actually utilizing the arbitral
forum. The distinction drawn by the Italian Colors Court between the
right to pursue a claim and the costs involved with proving a claim is
irrelevant to VCPs because the result will always end up the same: the
contractual language immunizes the drafter from liability. Consumers do
not care that they can still theoretically assert their rights. If it makes no
economic sense to do so, then they will not even consider asserting a
claim and the DCP escapes without incurring any cost.
The statutory language should provide that any arbitration provision
barring collective or class action is unenforceable upon a factual showing
by the claimant. The claimant should demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that individual arbitration would require said claimant to
incur substantial, unrecoverable costs greatly outweighing the potential
156
recovery and rendering arbitration impractical. This could easily be
inserted in the FAA’s savings clause, adding to the grounds upon which
157
an agreement can be invalidated.
Significant discretion should be left to the trial court judge to
determine whether the plaintiff has met her burden. Such an inquiry will
not invade the province of the arbitrator. This legislation will give the
judge the same level of discretion authorized under the FAA when a
judge is tasked with considering state-law defenses such as fraud, duress,
158
or unconscionability.
District courts have made this exact same cost-based inquiry many
times before, and past experience shows that the threshold will remain

155. See supra notes 18–20.
156. Such a situation will arise when the plaintiffs are faced with substantial upfront expenditures
to prosecute their claims, meaning the only economically feasible means of doing so is through a class
procedure. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 141 (2012). This can be distinguished from
the situation in both Coneff and Concepcion because, while “the individual damages awards available
to any single plaintiff were small . . . the fee-shifting provisions insured that a damaged plaintiff could
be made whole. The reason that a plaintiff may not bring a suit was not because he would not be likely
to recoup his costs, but rather because the small amount of damages was not worth his trouble.” Id.
157. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
158. Id.

1466

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1441

159

high. This legislation will allow lower courts to compel arbitration
160
according to “consumer-friendly” arbitration clauses while striking
cost-prohibitive CAAWs and allowing plaintiffs to proceed in the only
economically rational manner: a court-certified class action lawsuit.
One argument raised by opponents of the vindication of statutory
rights doctrine is that plaintiffs will attempt evade CAAWs by
manufacturing an affidavit or choosing pricey attorneys to increase their
161
upfront costs. This argument carries little weight because a costprohibitive situation will arise only in certain types of claims, such as
162
antitrust claims, and the courts are “perfectly capable of doing the
analysis necessary to determine if the plaintiffs have made the necessary
163
showing.” If lower courts are tasked with determining the scope of the
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a quite complex initial
task, they should be able to handle this similar inquiry.
This proposed legislation would have the dual effect of pushing
contract drafting to a more claimant-friendly end product while providing
certainty to a DCP that if they draft arbitration agreements that prevent
individual redress, that agreement will be invalidated and the DCP will
face a class action lawsuit. In the end, this should restore some faith in the
arbitration system that consumers now credibly view as merely a
corporate means of self-immunization.

Conclusion
Arbitration remains an effective means of quick and inexpensive
dispute resolution, but it cannot and should not be used to thwart a VCP
from asserting claims. Italian Colors sent shockwaves through the
164
consumer-advocate community. The American Association of Justice
went so far as to write that “[t]he Supreme Court rule[d] that corporations
can use the fine print of contracts to grant themselves a license to steal and

159. See supra notes 62−64.
160. Gilles, supra note 77, at 844.
161. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d at 142.
162. One possible suggestion for the specific claim limit here can be lifted from Thomas E.
Carbonneau’s proposed amendment to the FAA. He suggested “[c]ases involving the enforcement of
fundamental statutory rights” be deemed nonarbitrable, including “those arising from antitrust
statutes, the securities legislation, RICO, labor statutes, and other regulatory legislative frameworks
deemed essential by Congress.” Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 231, 273 (1990).
163. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681 F.3d at 142. If the courts are capable of determining
class action status under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and engaging in other types of initial
analysis, a cost-based analysis should provide the type of hurdle expected by detractors. Specific claims
under which the inquiry should be made can be fleshed out by the courts in due time.
164. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Justices Support Corporate Arbitration, N.Y. Times, June 20,
2013, at B3; Paul Bland, Worst Supreme Court Arbitration Decision Ever, Pub. Justice (June 20, 2013),
http://publicjustice.net/blog/worst-supreme-court-arbitration-decision-ever.
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165

violate the law.” Following Concepcion, some of the most well-known
166
167
168
companies in the world such as Microsoft, Instagram, and others
inserted arbitration clauses with CAAWs in their standard agreements.
After Italian Colors, there may be little preventing any corporation from
including a CAAW in contracts with consumers.
Congress passed the FAA with the intention that arbitration would
help facilitate claim adjudication. Now, with the proliferation of CAAWs
and repeated Supreme Court approval, DCPs can draft contracts that
prevent claims from ever seeing the light of day. Federal legislation would
override the detrimental impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors and
bring stability back to the arbitration system. Long gone are the days when
contracts of adhesion were considered by the courts to be unconscionable
and unenforceable, but by passing appropriate legislation, Congress can
signal that the little guy will be at least given the opportunity to have his or
her grievances heard.

165. Press Release, Am. Assoc. for Justice, AAJ Statement on SCOTUS Decision in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/
justice/hs.xsl/21293.htm.
166. Meg Marco, Microsoft Updates Service Agreement to Make It Easier to Read the New
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clause, Consumerist (Aug. 31, 2012), http://consumerist.com/
2012/08/31/microsoft-updates-service-agreement-to-make-it-easier-to-read-the-new-mandatorybinding-arbitration-clause.
167. Jacob Gersham, Have a Beef with Instagram? Civil Suit May Be Off Limits, Wall St. J.L.
Blog (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/01/02/have-a-beef-with-instagram-a-civilsuit-might-be-off-limits/?cb=logged0.35796129144728184.
168. Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, Pub. Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/forced-arbitrationrogues-gallery (last visited June 1, 2014).
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